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Empathy and the Potential Body of Imagination 
 
Empathy and imagination are closely connected. Empathy can be defined as the 
ability to imagine the experiences, the feelings and the thoughts of others. 
Imagination, vice versa, being the ability to make representations of what one cannot 
experience directly, such as the state of mind of other people, supposes the ability to 
feel or to think into (em-pathè) someone else. So empathy and imagination seem toe 
presuppose each other. 
 
In this paper, I will discuss empathy taken as the ability to share the feelings of others 
through imagination – even though the term is often used in a much broader sense, 
referring to a certain attitude (patience, openness), or behavior (listening).1 In my 
view, however, empathy is taken to mean ‘knowing’ emotionally what another person 
feels.2 The reasons for defining the term in this way can be clarified using theories on 
emotions, i.e. theories providing answers to such questions as: what is an emotion; 
how and to what extent do I know my own emotions and those of others; what 
happens when I empathize with someone, and when someone empathizes with me?3  
 
1. Empathy and Emotion Theories 
My position in the field of emotional theories, from which perspective I set out to 
answer the abovementioned questions, can be summarized as follows.4 I have 
attempted to bridge the philosophical and psychological gap between commonly 
accepted twentieth century cognitive emotion theories on the one hand, and William 
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James’s supposedly outdated nineteenth century theory on the other. Since 
Wittgenstein’s criticism of the traditional, more passion-like emotion theories, the 
cognitive theories have become increasingly dominant over the twentieth century. 
These theories consider emotions to incorporate cognition, i.e. pieces of information 
about reality. If I am scared of something, my fear contains the information that the 
object is threatening or dangerous to me, or at least seems to be. My envy tells me that 
someone has something desirable that seems inaccessible to me. And my joy refers to 
something favorable for me. It should be noted, however, that the emotional 
information has the character of seeming and looking like – for, as we have known 
since Plato and Aristotle, there are no greater mistakes than emotional ones. Although 
the information encapsulated in emotions is susceptible to error, cognitivists still 
contend that information is the essence of emotions.  
 
Whereas the cognitive theories discuss emotions in terms of – as their name implies – 
cognitive, information-providing, communicative actions, while focusing on the 
external, visible and discussable aspect of emotions, James emphasizes the aspect of 
self-perception or self-experience that characterizes emotions.5 This aspect, which is 
referred to as ‘inner’ self-perception, implies that one always also experiences oneself 
while experiencing a certain emotion. If I am afraid of someone or something, I feel 
that I am afraid; if I am angry with somebody, I feel that I am angry; and if I am 
ashamed or relieved or happy, I feel something about myself. This feeling oneself 
may be quite overwhelming or absorbing, as our passions are. The cognitive theories, 
by reducing emotions to cognition, seem to ignore the passionate character of 
emotions that is connected to their self-experience aspect, which I will discuss here 
because of its importance to empathy. 
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Nevertheless, because I consider both views to be partly correct, I propose a ‘new’ 
linking theory, which includes the two views as aspects of a single open concept.6 The 
wording I have chosen to express the concept appears at first sight to be rather cryptic: 
I feel I am v to x. An emotion is an experience of myself (I feel I am) in relation to a 
reason or cause (x). The v in the formula I feel I am v to x stands for a particular 
feeling, and to x refers to the cognitive relationship with the emotion’s reason or cause. 
Almost all our emotions can be understood in this manner: I feel I am ashamed (v) for 
my wrongdoing (x); I feel I am relieved (v) about my exam result (x); I feel I am afraid 
(v) about increasing violence (x); I feel I am happy (v) when I see you (x). The 
formula articulates both the self-experience aspect of the emotion and the cognitive, 
informative, communicable relationship to the cause that invokes the emotion, i.e. the 
‘object’ of the emotion: the persons or things to which the emotion relates. However, 
this does not mean that this is the form in which emotions are usually communicated, 
although almost all our emotions can be articulated and understood according to this 
formula. On the contrary, a communicative statement in the form of ‘I feel I am v to x’ 
suggests reflexivity not usually attributed to emotions. Indeed, what is typically 
emotional about an emotion is that one gets absorbed in it. This self-absorption goes 
hand in hand with one’s experience of oneself in an emotion. I will return to this point 
shortly. 
 
2. Empathy and Self-Experience 
The self-experience aspect of emotions is particularly important with respect to 
empathy, because it is this aspect of somebody’s emotion that somebody else’s 
empathy relates to. And therefore not to the external debatable x-side, as is often 
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thought. Talking about the object of an emotion is not the same as empathy. Put more 
strongly: it is often the antithesis of it. Comforting words, such as ‘the dog will not 
bite’ (to a child), ‘poverty is relative’ (to a mother on social security) or ‘there are 
worse illnesses’ (to a patient) may be true statements about the object of someone’s 
fear, but they express little empathy. The primary purpose of empathy is not to bring 
people to a better understanding of their situation, though it may be subsidiary. 
Empathy is primarily is supporting and empowering somebody’s self-experience, 
preventing them from solitary drowning in their own feelings. But how can my 
empathy relate to the inner aspect of someone else’s emotion? This can be answered 
by clarifying the kind of perception that emotional self-experience is. 
 
I refer to the nature of the experience of one’s self in an emotion by using the 
phenomenological term ‘elemental’.7 This denotes a form of perception in which the 
experiencing ‘subject’ is absorbed by the perceived ‘object’. I touched upon this 
briefly above. It is an experience in which the ‘subject’ is exposed to or swallowed up 
by the ‘object’. This can be compared with being exposed to a storm, or to the glow of 
a fire; with being surrounded by water when swimming. Hence the term ‘elemental’. 
In this form of perception, rather than seeing ‘things’ as objects at a distance, the 
object is seen as having the character of an element – in the old sense of the word: fire, 
light, water – that surrounds me. (Consequently, subject and object lose their 
customary meaning–hence the inverted commas). Therefore, the inner side of an 
emotion–the experience of feeling oneself as fearful, angry, relieved or happy – is 
elemental in its make-up. While the external side of an emotion is a relationship with 
an object (the animal that I am afraid of, the exam result about which I am relieved, 
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etc.), the inner side of the emotion consists of being absorbed with oneself, being 
exposed to one’s fearful or relieved self.  
 
With this elemental self-perception, which I consider to form the inner side of 
emotions, something remarkable is happening. It differs in an important respect from 
ordinary sensory perception, such as seeing and hearing. In classic philosophical 
terms, every current or actual perception of something can be thought of as being 
surrounded by a horizon of potential perceptions. For example, if I see a bed before 
me, my actual perception of one side of the bed is accompanied by potential 
perceptions of the other sides of the bed (which I do not actually see at that moment, 
but could see – hence the term potential – if I walked around the bed), as well as the 
potential perceptions of other things in close proximity to the bed, which I am not 
actually focusing on at that moment. These actual and potential perceptions together 
form my perception of the bed. The potential perceptions form an important 
contribution to what I actually see. They support my perception in the sense that I 
really see a bed, and that this is not an apparition or hallucination. And they partly 
determine the meaning of what I see. Therefore, it makes a considerable difference to 
what I see, whether the bed is in a bedroom, in a hospital, or in a psychoanalyst’s 
consulting room. 
 
3. The Potential Character of Empathy 
This brief theory of sensory perception derives from the phenomenologist Edmund 
Husserl (1982). Its fundamental categories of actuality and potentiality can even be 
traced back to Aristotle. When we try to transfer this theory and its categories to the 
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field of emotional experience, however, we appear to be faced with a problem. There 
seems to be no room for potentiality in an elemental perception, such as the self-
experience side of emotions. If the perceiver is immersed in the perceived, there is no 
surrounding, and it is not possible to recognize other sides to the perceived. An 
elemental perception is, as it were, a perception limited to actuality. On the other hand, 
elemental perceptions are not always faint and uncertain, like apparitions or mirages. 
Moreover, they are not always meaningless. On the contrary, they are usually more or 
less stable and have substantial meaning. In terms of the above theory, there must be 
some kind of potentiality in our emotional experiences for them to become real and to 
be given meaning. What could this potentiality consist of? 
 
I would suggest taking one step further than Husserl, and to admit that the horizon of 
potential sensations surrounding any actual perception consists not only, and not 
exclusively, of sensations by the same subject (who walks around the thing or turns it 
around in his hand) but also by other subjects. Obviously, this may seem like an 
evident statement, but Husserl’s solipsist perspective has indeed prevented him from 
noticing this point. My perception of an object implies the possibility of others joining 
my perception and perceiving the same object themselves. In my theory, this 
possibility is not just a possibility, but is the very potential factor supporting my 
perceptions. Consequently, others guarantee the genuineness, the reality, of the things I 
perceive, and others constitute – to a certain degree – the meaning of my perception. 
This applies not only to sensory perceptions, but also to the inner self-experience side 
of our emotional perceptions. Applied to the elemental self-experience, the stability 
and meaning-giving potential of emotions comes from others: others who sympathize 
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with me and who instinctively empathize with me. Empathic persons add potential 
perceptions to my actual elemental self-perceptions, giving them stability and 
meaning. In this respect, others are as unavoidable as they are indispensable. Its 
potential character can explain the supporting effect of empathy, which most of us 
probably recognize from experience. Unlike Husserl’s horizon of potentiality, I speak 
of the potential body, consisting of the other’s empathy with me. 
 
This allows a persistent misunderstanding concerning empathy to be eliminated, 
namely that empathic sympathy does not help someone who is suffering, or even that it 
intensifies their suffering. Nietzsche – the most prominent critic of this point – rejected 
empathy, especially in the shape of compassion, as a malign form of pity, because it 
has the effect of doubling the suffering: not only does the victim suffer, but also the 
person who shows him pity.8 Nietzsche and his followers would have been right, 
however, if the person who shows empathic sympathy actually feels the same as the 
person he empathizes with. Unlike Nietzsche, however, empathizing with someone, I 
do not have the actual feelings that he or she has, but potential ones. If the other has 
feelings of grief or pain as a result of a loss, my empathy involves potential grief. It is, 
after all, not my loss. Consequently, I do not actually feel grief or hurt while 
empathizing, but potential grief or vulnerability. This potential character of empathy, a 
reasoned theoretical conclusion from our line of thought, can be explained practically 
(though not exhaustively) in the realization that ‘this could happen to me’. This feeling 
of vulnerability is a characteristic or a part of the experience of empathy. The 
realization that fear also contributes forms an additional argument for the potential 
character of empathy. After all, fear can be understood to be potential pain. (There is 
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another possible misunderstanding concerning empathy, which is discussed in the 
following section.) 
 
4. Gruesome Sham-Empathy 
Nevertheless, Nietzsche touches on an important point. There is such a thing as a 
cumulative build-up of emotions – good and bad, pleasant and nasty –, which seems to 
be caused by an instinctive sympathy of people with each other. But is this empathy? 
The best example of such an accumulation is the mass outburst of grief following the 
death of Princess Diana in 1997. To say that people were infected by each other’s 
heartache is an understatement. A collective sea of sadness, in which people became 
immersed, swept across most of England (and elsewhere) – partly fueled by media 
attention. Happier examples of a collective immersion and the sharing of each other’s 
emotions may be found in cases of sport fanaticism and in the sweeping idolatry of 
pop stars. But there are smaller-scale examples of such diving into each other’s 
emotions, whether this bathing occurs voluntarily or involuntarily. Who has never had 
the giggles in the company of others? This is a strange phenomenon, in which people 
wind each other up into a collective fit of laughter that steadily increases in intensity, 
even though nobody can remember what started it. And who has not experienced a 
dejected mood, which hangs in the air and gets the better of you? A less innocent 
example is the panic that can spontaneously occur in a certain situation and spreads to 
everyone present. And the most serious examples also deserve mention: the furious 
collective hate of a lynch party and the hysteria of the Nazi rallies. No, Nietzsche was 
right: when people wallow in each other’s feelings, things only get worse. 
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However, I think that these examples do not involve empathy, in the abovementioned 
sense of potential feelings, with respect to the actual feelings of others with whom one 
sympathizes. What is striking in the abovementioned examples of collective 
immersion in each other’s emotions – irrespective of how different they are, and 
though there is still much to say about each of them – is that they relate to actual 
feelings. One is immersed in the actual grief, the actual joy or the actual hate that 
people take on from others. It is no coincidence that one can describe what happens in 
these examples with ‘elemental’ metaphors, such as diving in, bathing, being washed 
over and being immersed. In these situations, feelings are shared, but not, I feel, in an 
empathic manner. Empathy is not the same as collectively bathing or immersing in 
actual feelings. Empathy is the inclusion of one’s own potential feelings in the actual 
feelings of the other, connecting my potential feelings to the other’s actual 
experiences.  
 
5. Good Empathy and Imagination 
The distinction between actual and potential feelings is very important to a general 
understanding of empathy. Imagining oneself in someone else’s emotions occurs, if 
done correctly, based on one’s own potential emotions. Emotional empowerment 
consists of linking potential feelings to actual ones. In this last section, I will attempt to 
articulate this somewhat abstract-sounding proposition in a more tangible fashion, 
through the potential body of imagination.  
 
How is empathy related to what I call the potential body of imagination? I assume that, 
when someone with empathy engages with the emotions of another, he experiences 
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some kind of recognition. Let us take the context of care, counseling and guidance as 
the paradigmatic situation of empathy.9 The emotions of the client are not entirely 
alien to the empathizer. He knows them from personal experience, from experiences 
with other clients, from professional literature, from impressions of films or novels, 
etc. The empathizer’s recognition of the client’s emotions entails that the empathizer 
approaches the client’s emotions based on his own potential emotions – recalled 
emotions of what he himself has experienced or learned, provided that he has come to 
terms with these. His emotions were probably once actual emotions. When the 
experience now being remembered occurred, it was accompanied by actual emotions 
that were relevant to the actual situation. With the passing of time, they are no longer 
actual but potential. In this potential capacity they form precisely the framework for 
new experiences that occur, e.g. expectations in which new experiences are 
interpreted. But this assumes that one has come to terms or has coped with these 
memories. If an empathizer himself has emotions that he has not yet come to terms 
with, e.g. emotions relating to a traumatic experience, then there is the chance that a 
client’s similar experiences and emotions will reawaken his emotions, with all the 
gruesome dangers that were discussed above. What in ordinary language is called 
coping or coming to terms with one’s emotions is, as I would express it, a case of one’s 
emotions becoming potential. 
 
For good empathy, the client’s emotions are therefore approached and interpreted in 
the light of these ‘potentialized’ memories. Empathically engaging with the client’s 
emotions, interpreting these actual emotions from the empathizer’s potential emotions, 
means reconstructing the emotions of the client. In doing so, the empathizer is 
 
 
11 
constructing a potential body. It may sound strange – empathy as reconstruction – but 
it is through this that the client’s emotions are released from their loneliness, acquire 
meaning, and are placed in a cultural context. Thus empathy can be empowering. 
 
I consider the best way to understand the reconstruction of a potential body referred to 
here – the interpretation of the client’s emotions in the light of the ‘potentialized’ 
memories of the empathizer – is as a narrative process. The empathizer writes or 
rewrites the story that the client tells. In narrative theories a distinction is generally 
made between the author, the narrator, the characters and the reader or listener of the 
story.10 According to these theories, the empathizer may be regarded as the author, and 
the client both as the narrator and as principal character of the story that they 
reconstruct together.11 Of course, the empathizer may also become a character in the 
client’s life story. That the client has the part of the narrator and is usually the principal 
character appears to be self-evident. But why is the empathizer the author of the story, 
and not the client? Or, perhaps both should be co-authors? This relates again to the 
difference between the actual and the potential, and to the division of roles between 
empathizer and client. Care relationships are concerned with the actual emotions of the 
client and the corresponding potential emotions of the empathizer. The empathic help 
of the care worker includes – based on his own potential emotions – opening up, 
putting them in perspective, linking, and adding meaning with respect to the actual 
emotions of the client. It is the writer who has the power of empowerment. The 
potentiality that the empathizer contributes clearly includes the imaginative power with 
which he engages with the client’s actual emotions. It is precisely this imagination, 
with all its potentialities, that is able to force open the inner side of the client’s 
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emotions, give room to his feelings, let them breathe, add meaning, link them with 
other experiences (whether one’s own or not), put them in perspective and place them 
in a cultural context, or – to summarize all this in one word – empower his self-
experience. And because the imagination does not remain in the head of the 
empathizer but is communicated to the client, in such a way that the client remains the 
narrator and principal character, the empathizer can, in narrative terms, be compared 
with an author. An empathic care worker or counselor must be like a good novelist. 
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